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A social semiotics analysis of Islamic State’s use of beheadings: images of power, 
masculinity, spectacle and propaganda.  
 
Despite their predominant role in terrorist practices, beheadings have not received sufficient 
theoretical or empirical attention.  The aim of this paper is to explore images of executions by 
employing social semiotics theory and visual analysis and assess their function. Beheadings 
by the Islamic State will be employed as an example of spectacular violence. Decapitation 
will be discussed as a theatrical strategy that attempts to legitimise the Islamic State (and its 
political project) and to impact upon recruitment of new militants: this is achieved not only 
by causing material damage, but also by triggering more mundane sentiments in young 
people who may be more inclined to be attracted to extremist discourses.  
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All throughout history, the act of decapitation has exercised contradictory sentiments: 
a power battle between horror, disgust, fascination, hatred and entertainment. Like other 
areas that have recently witnessed  a revival of ‘old ways’ -e.g. the return to old healing texts 
in order to fight microbes and bacteria (Harrison et al. 2015) or ‘cupping’ trends among 
Olympic athletes and celebrities- in the past few years some ‘criminal justice systems’ across 
the globe saw a resurgence of ancient punitive practices: China has been accused of medieval 
torture methods by Amnesty (Phillips, 2015) and has recently invited residents in Guangdong 
to watch 10 people being sentenced to death in a sport stadium (Haas, 2017); in 2014 Saudi 
Arabia executed 158 people (Agerholm, 2017), whereas in 2016 beheadings in the country 
reached the highest level in two decades (Associated Press, 2016);  in this global landscape, 
actions by the Islamic State, in particular, its punitive behaviour towards ‘infidels’  are 
frequently associated with medieval punishment.  
This frequent association is the rationale for this article. The article will focus on the 
spectacularisation produced by the act of beheading: sentiments like horror, fascination, 
amusement, along with the idea of carnivalization will constitute the core of this discussion. 
These ‘emotions’ have not been selected randomly; to echo Larson’s words, heads are truly 
amazing (Larson, 2014), no wonder they capture our imaginary like no other body part:   
 
there are lots of good physiological reasons why people find heads fascinating and 
powerful and tempting to remove. The human head is a biological powerhouse and 
visual delight. It accommodates four of our five senses: sight, smell, hearing and it 
draws in the air we breathe and delivers the words we speak. As the evolutionary 
biologist Daniel Lieberman has written, ‘almost every particle entering your body, 
either to nourish you or to provide information about the world enters via your 
head, and almost every activity involves something going on in your head’. 
(Larson, 2014: 11) 
 
Traditionally, heads are symbols of reason and power; removing somebody’s head, 
along with its public display delivers a strong message of dominance. In the past few years, 
the Islamic State has made wide use of this symbolic form of execution, whose message 
transcends cultural boundaries. As I shall argue in this article, understanding this strategic 
choice of punishment (and its fascination) can cast some light on the reasons why so many 
young people, especially western-born, feel attracted to racialization discourses.  
 At the end of April 2016, Canadian hostage John Risdell was killed by Abu Sayyaf 
militants (a pro al-Qaeda group) in the Philippines. His severed head was found in a remote 
island, five hours after the expiry of a ransom deadline. Once again, Westerners were brutally 
executed by the hands of extremists. Existing discussions regarding extremism and 
radicalisation found new vigour in various areas: from politics to social media, from the 
academic arena to diplomacy. However, despite their predominant role in terrorist practices, 
beheadings (and videos of executions) do not seem to feature frequently in terrorism 
scholarship. Friis (2015) noted how beheadings and execution videos have neither been 
subject to extensive empirical study nor received substantial theoretical attention.  
Traditionally, terrorism research has developed around (but it is not confined to) the axis of 
cultural/religious radicalisation (with particular focus on Islamic terrorism), the psychology 
of terrorist behaviours/collective resistance and, more recently, critical studies on terrorism 
(Pearlstain, 1991; De Mause, 2002; Stern, 2003; Benmelech et al, 2012; Phillips et al, 2014). 
Beheadings have been absorbed by broader discussions on ‘new terrorism’ and its greater 
brutality (Jäckle and Baumann, 2015), but they have not received adequate primary focus.  
The concept of religious violence has been inherently connected to radical, extreme 
practices (Cavanaugh, 2009). Classical approaches to terrorism have discussed and analysed 
terror in terms of holiness and sacredness, illustrating how religion could provide a 
justification for extreme practices (Rapoport, 1984; Rapoport and Alexander, 1982; Laqueur, 
1977 and Price, 1977). Executions by Islamic State militants show an intention to construct a 
sacredness of both their action and their so-called state. Juergensmeyer (2003) explored how 
religion, humiliation, masculinity and violence are entangled in the tapestry of terrorist 
warfare, where violence and religion frequently come in tandem. Faith and religion are 
regarded as forces capable of instigating radical behaviour, creating, consequently, a 
‘different’ form of terrorism: Hoffman (2006) considers the different value systems of this 
new form of violence, its ways of justifying and legitimising actions. He argues that religion 
is the most important component in current terrorist discourses today, effectively rendering 
religious terrorism one of the most lethal forms of violence. Beheadings play with sacred, 
religious images that evoke a sense of transcendence and can be understood by everybody 
independently of an individual’s religious beliefs.  However, Gunning and Jackson (2011) 
challenged the idea of ‘religious terrorism’, arguing that the religious label requires further 
qualification to enrich our understanding of violence. The authors suggest that it could be 
beneficial to seek alternative approaches to the investigation of how beliefs and institutional 
structures interact with political violence. 
 The notion that religious beliefs motivate fanatics of terror has frequently been 
discussed in tandem with radicalisation of Muslim youth (particularly, young men). 
Integration, alienation from both parental culture and culture of the country of birth, along 
with socialisation towards violence have been of central interest for terrorism studies and 
youth studies alike (Lynch, 2013; Horgan, 2008; Silke, 2008). It is also possible to locate the 
issue of youth radicalisation within the axes of history, culture and political engagement. 
Violent rites of passages have impacted upon our cultural history: not only have they 
demarcated important points of transition in life (Van Gennep, 1909/2011; and Bosnia et al, 
2015), but they have also captured young people’s imagination. The sense of belonging that 
comes with following a particular social or political cause represents another fundamental 
consideration for a well-rounded discussion on youth radicalisation and attractions to extreme 
dogmas. In a study on young Muslims living in London, Ryan (2014) noted how religion 
helps young Muslims to negotiate and navigate their identity within a secular society. In the 
example of the Islamic State, religion is closely entwined with political causes; consequently, 
research on young people’s engagement with activism can enhance a discussion of Muslim 
radicalisation. Whereas belief in a cause cannot be associated to the experiences of 
radicalisation and extremism, it is worth noting that sharing social, religious and/or political 
beliefs allows young people to establish connections with others, to (re)affirm and shape their 
identities: this is especially relevant today where a good portion of socialisation takes place 
via platforms like Twitter and Facebook, which are also used by radical political groups to 
spread their message. Social media platforms also favour the circulation of pseudo-sacred 
images, like the ones featuring Islamic State militants executing western prisoners.  
 In recent years, with the introduction of new methods brought to the fields of 
criminology and terrorist studies (e.g. computational methods), a need to enhance more 
traditional scholarship has arisen. Critical terrorism studies emerged in response to what was 
thought to be a simplistic approach to terrorism by orthodox terrorism scholarship (eg. 
Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Reid, 1997; Silke, 2004; Ranstorp, 2006). Stronger 
methodological and epistemological rigour led a new research agenda that intends to extend 
and deepen the study of terrorism and terrorists (Gunning, 2007; Herring, 2008; Toros, 2008; 
Zulaika, 2008). This body of research has emphasised the need to tackle terrorist practices 
from a perspective that can integrate more traditional socio-psychological approaches. The 
use of decapitation as a terrorist strategy, along with the use of social media by both militants 
and terrorist sympathisers, should be analysed by employing an analytical framework that 
allows us to explore images of beheadings more rigorously.  
 Finally, orthodox and unorthodox research presents a valuable theoretical framework 
to advance the understanding of terrorist practices: discussion on the use of beheadings sits 
comfortably within the scholarship presented so far. However, I suggest this could be 
enhanced by exploring practices like beheadings from a more ‘mundane’ angle, looking at 
the possible entertainment that may raise from engaging (both passively and actively) with 
inhumane practices like decapitation, along with their context of consumption: in other 
words, I propose to explore the element of carnivalesque (especially in popular Western 
culture), which may impact upon the reception of the Islamic State’s cultural production, 
regardless of their producers’ intentions.   
 
Ontology and Methodology 
 
 The aim of this work is to address some of the gaps in the study of beheadings by the 
Islamic State. The main research objective is to explore the power of images and how these 
can be understood, not only as a means to advance terrorist politics (triggering military 
mobilisation and social division), but also as a way to ‘impress’ and involve potential 
sympathisers via the spectacularisation of executions.  
This work will apply theories of social semiotics (Jewitt, 1997; Jewitt and Oyama, 
2001) to its research sample. Furthermore, the analytical structure provided by Kress and Van 
Leeuwen’s multimodal framework and visual analysis techniques (1996) will be adapted to 
the analysis of five images of Islamic State’s executions.  
Main research question: 
1. What does the use of widely publicised beheadings signify? 
Sub questions: 
2. Is there something mundane in spectacular executions? 
3. What type of interaction is invoked between the action in the image and viewers? 
4. Does a close social nearness/distance create a sense of connection in the viewers?  
 
Sample 
 For the purpose of this work, a purposive sample has been selected. Informal data 
from various websites (e.g. Al Jazeera; Guardian; New York Times; BBC News; El Pais; La 
Repubblica; Libération; Le Monde; Die Welt)1 showed that 2014 registered a peak of 
reported executions. The executions (and some executioners like Jihadi John) selected here 
received international attention and became extremely familiar to the general public in 
Europe and North America.  
 
Images of five (n=5) executions by the Islamic State in 2014 (Appendix 1).  
1. James Foley (19th August) 
2. Steven Sotloff (2nd September) 
3. David Haines (13th September) 
4. Hervé Gourdel (24th September) 
5. Alan Henning (3rd October) 
 
Selection Criteria 
 
The five selected images were the top ones that kept appearing across various search 
engines (Google; Bing; Dogpile; Ecosia). These search engines were selected being some of 
the most used on the web. Search was conducted in English, French, Spanish, Italian and 
German using the following keywords: ISIS, ISIL, beheadings, decapitation, decapitazione, 
décapitation, decapitación, Enthauptung, Ausführung, esecuzione, execution, execution, 
ejecución, Islamic state, stato islamico, etat islamique, Islamischen Staat, estado islámico. 
These images are screenshots of execution videos: news/media channels disseminated this 
visual material and operated their own judgement of what to divulge to the public (therefore 
the images were partially manipulated). I chose the screenshots (as opposed to full length 
videos) for this work in terms of online popularity as these would be the most recurrent and 
                                                
1 As I had no access to official/reliable statistics on executions, I cross-checked data from Wikipedia with a 
wide range of European and American news websites, which reported on execution trends. The main criteria for 
the selection of these sources was that their reporting was also cross-checked. I also attempted to replicate these 
values by searching news in different languages. Search in English, Italian, French, German and Spanish news 
sites confirmed 2014 as a year of high density of executions.  
disseminated images, seen by everybody, not only by people who actively searched for them 
or decided to watch execution videos. 
 
Analytical frameworks: Social Semiotic Theory 
 Semiotics is a philosophical approach to the study, use and interpretation of signs and 
symbols (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996; Kress, 2010). A culture’s symbolic systems, like 
images or texts, function as a means of communication: what people do or say can be 
interpreted through visual or written communication. Jewitt and Oyama (2001: 134) suggest 
that semiotic systems can be understood as codes that set out rules for connecting signs and 
meanings. Barthes (1973) explores how people interpret what they see. His key idea is an 
interpretative process that follows two main stages: denotation encourages people to ask 
themselves what or who has been depicted in the image; connotation makes people reflect 
upon what ideas and values are raised by the representation (Barthes, 1973; Van Leeuwen, 
2001). Social semiotics induce a reflection on the signifier (the object/quality) and what this 
signifier means. In this respect, social semiotics theory can offer the fields of criminology 
and terrorism studies some insights into how to describe, analyse and interpret events or 
experiences that are not easily accessible for data collection, like terrorist organisations and 
their actions. For example, in the context of this work, the five images of executions are 
considered visual resources that are crafted and staged to divulge specific semiotic messages 
and meanings: in the lack of direct access to Islamic State militants, these images can support 
scholars in their inference.  
 Three analytical dimensions have been taken into consideration. These are adapted 
and based on visual analysis articulated by the multimodal method (Kress and Leeuwen, 
1996). Representational meanings are projected by the producers of an image and explore 
the syntax of images. For example, in the images used in this work, we recognise the man 
kneeling as the prisoner. Representational meanings can be divided into two groups (Jewitt 
and Oyama, 2001: 141): narrative representations (participants are connected by actions and 
vectors) and conceptual patterns (No actions nor vectors connect participants, which are 
represented as timeless essences). Interactive meanings explore the attitudes viewers have 
towards the image. Three aspects inform interactive meanings (Jewitt and Van Leeuwen, 
1996): distance (subjects in the image bring viewers closer to the visual action and establish 
direct relationships with them), contact (people inside the picture look directly at viewers), 
point of view (identification with the scene in terms of eye level between producers and 
viewers; complicity as eyes of executioners are at the same level as the eyes of the viewers). 
Compositional meanings refer to the way the content of an image is structured (Jewitt and 
Oyama, 2001: 147): information values suggest that the role of an element in the image 
depends on its location in relation to the picture (eg. top, bottom, centre); framing looks at the 
way participants are represented as belonging together (continuity) or being separate 
(discontinuity); salience suggests that some elements in the picture are more eye-catching 
than others; modality is the reality value, so how real or surreal an image is.  
 
Analysis 
 Before starting the visual analysis, the context of viewing (where the image is and 
why the viewer is looking at the image) and context of production (how the image was 
produced and disseminated) should be considered in relation to the activities of the Islamic 
State.  
 
The Islamic State 
As per December 2015, the Islamic State has about 30,000 fighters from at least 85 
countries (Benmelech and Flor, 2016). The origins of the organisation go back to 2002 when 
Musab al-Zarqawi started to train extremist combatants. These became central actors in the 
Iraqi insurgency against American occupation, organizing themselves in a group that swore 
fealty to Al-Qaeda. The group gradually declined, partly due to increased security of both 
Iraqi and US forces, but found new vigour in 2011, when it started to become involved with 
the Syrian civil war (Mapping Militant Organizations Project, Stanford University, 2016). 
Similar to al-Qaeda, the group identifies itself as a Jihadi-Salafist movement, which adheres 
to extremist and narrowly interpreted readings of the Quran, along with strict doctrinal 
concepts like ‘true’ Muslims must associate themselves with other ‘true’ Muslims only 
(Bunzel, 2015: 10). In 2014, during an attempt to take over Sunni Iraq, the Islamic State 
proclaimed the restoration of the caliphate (transnational Islamic empire), effectively 
attempting to position itself as the successor of the early Islamic caliphate.    
Today, the Islamic State is a Salafi militant organization that aims to expand the 
caliphate: its project is not simply military, but also political, with plans to construct social 
structures of a ‘legitimate’, theocratic state. Their choice of name for the organisation is 
indicative of an intention to create something that resembles nation-statehood:   in 2015, 
leaked documents revealed that Islamic State plans to set up a treasury and an economic 
program to be self-sufficient, along with various government departments, including a 
Ministry for education and health (Shiv, 2015). The concept of nation-state implies share of 
common identity and culture (Yuval-Davis, 1997), along with effective governance (Kohli, 
2004). In this respect, it is possible to suggest a connection between traditional 
understandings of nation-state and the notion of theocratic state by the Islamic State: in 
particular, the organisation uses a linguistic strategy that attempts to construct and reinforce 
the idea of Muslim Ummah (a community that transcends national boundaries) (Georges, 
2015).  
 The Islamic State has reached high visibility due to its spectacular executions of 
foreign workers and individuals who do not fit their narrow interpretation of Islam. 
Unofficial data available on beheadings mark a peak of their use in 2014 and a sharp decline 
in 2015-20162. Foreign fighters also play the role of executioners. Various explanations have 
been sought to explain the phenomenon of Westerners joining the Islamic State. Benmelech 
and Flor (2016) found that poor economic conditions did not impact on recruitment of 
militants: in fact, the number of foreign fighters joining the organisation is positively 
correlated with a country’s GDP. Perhaps this correlation can be interpreted in terms of 
means to travel to join the organisation.  
Knowing what the Islamic State is and does is relevant to the understanding of how 
the depiction of their actions is perceived. The viewer, in fact, shares this knowledge. In this 
respect, it is important to understand how their deeds are consumed and how these reach 
external audiences.   
 
Context of Viewing 
 The images of beheading selected for this work were found on the internet, as part of 
news articles reporting each execution.  The images are in the virtual world, where viewers 
can consume them from the anonymity of their homes. It can be argued that this anonymised 
context may favour (in some individuals) what I would define as voyeurism of gruesome, 
violent events. The way viewers experience the consumption of these pictures changes 
according to the context the images are seen: news, YouTube, pro-terrorism websites, blogs 
all offer different frames, in which the visual message is confronted and perceived. Images of 
executions viewed in a journalistic context may constitute an intentional viewing or may be 
perceived as supporting information to a story. Seeing the image (or video) on YouTube or 
Dailymotion may imply a more active engagement with the content: key word search or 
suggestions based on similar viewings imply the fact the viewer actively searched for images 
                                                
2 Data collected from various news websites: Al Jazeera, Guardian, New York Times, BBC News, El Pais, La Repubblica, 
Libération, Le Monde. 
that display a specific content. Sites like YouTube and Dailymotion allow viewers to 
consume images as spectacle or theatre. If the image of an execution is accessed via pro-
terrorist websites and forums, its consumption and interpretation may be regarded as more 
political and purposive, fulfilling a guerrilla strategy.  
 
Context of Production 
 This context is particularly relevant to an analysis of images of beheadings and 
discussion on terrorism. This context encourages reflection on the distribution of the image 
and the intentions/motives for this. It is undeniable that by disseminating images of 
executions, the Islamic State intends to legitimise its organisation and project its power 
within the global landscape. The five images considered in this work were released after the 
execution: particularly, pictures 1,2,3,5 (Appendix 1) are very neat and staged. The main 
question relates to what the reason for such staging is: these four images are polished and 
extremely cinematographic. The contrast between the colours of the two actors (black and 
orange) sits perfectly sat within the colours of the background (the blue of the sky and the 
light brown of the soil). The scene is surreal, produced, not just to fulfil its function 
(beheading), but also to send out two messages: the first (most basic) message is a message of 
threat and demand of recognition to the ‘enemies’; the second (more elaborated) message, I 
should argue in the next section, is a marketing strategy to sell a ‘glamorised’ type of 
guerrilla and the recognition that the roles of captors and captives have been turned upside 
down.  
 Picture 4 (which was not directly choreographed by the Islamic State, but by an 
affiliated group) has a more perfunctory function: this is an unpolished screenshot of the 
execution, aimed at scaring the ‘enemies’, but not to craft an appealing, fantastic 
representation of an execution. Picture 4 is demanding, violent and brutal.   
 
Visual Analysis based on Kress and Leeuwen (1996)’s multimodality  
 
 Number of 
participant
s 
Representation
al Meaning: 
narrative (N)  
or conceptual 
(C) 
Interactive Meaning: 
Distance (D); Contact 
(C); Point of view (P) 
Composition meaning: 
Information values (I); 
framing (F); salience (S); 
modality (M) 
Possible 
interpretatio
n 
Pictur
e 1 
2 N 
 
There is a vector 
(the executioner’s 
hand touches the 
D: medium shot; viewer 
induced to establish a 
social relationship with 
subjects in the picture 
C: direct contact with 
I: centrality: background 
emphasises the two bodies 
located at the centre of the 
image to increase the 
viewer’s attention. The line 
Staged scene 
where the 
function of each 
actor is clear; 
figure of 
prisoner’s 
shoulder/neck); 
the two bodies are 
represented as 
anticipating the 
main action 
(beheading): there 
is a subtle action 
(executioner 
points dagger at 
the viewer, by 
lifting one arm and 
leaving his free 
arm on the 
prisoner). 
viewer; the executioner 
points dagger towards 
the viewer (viewer is 
addressed directly), 
symbolically demanding 
something out of the 
viewer. The executioner 
also puts his hand on the 
prisoner, establishing a 
stronger connection 
between the viewer and 
the prisoner. 
P: frontal, slightly low 
angle: viewer 
experiences increased 
identification/involveme
nt with the scene, but it 
is also under the power 
of the image. 
of the horizon seems to 
increase attention on the 
prisoner’s neckline. 
F: continuity between the 
two actors, achieved via the 
executioner’s arm resting on 
prisoner’s shoulder/neck. 
This continuity is extended 
to the viewer via the 
pointing of the dagger.  
S: black outfit of 
executioner. Ninjas, in 
Japanese tradition, signified 
a sense of ‘invisibility. The 
orange attire of prisoner is a 
reference to the orange 
scrubs of Guantanamo 
Bay’s prisoners, but it also 
has a cinematographic 
recognition (tv series 
Orange is the New Black).  
M: sensory modality 
increases the surreal 
symbolism of the action 
(beheading). Victim is on 
his knees while executioner 
is standing. Typical gesture 
of beheadings reminding of 
ancient forms of punishment 
(execution) in history and 
culture.  
executioner 
dressed in black 
suggests power, 
control. Black 
attire may 
remind 
audiences of 
early Japanese 
drawings of 
ninjas: strength, 
guerrilla, 
mercenary.  
Strong 
relationship 
between viewer 
and actors in 
image: 
involvement in 
both terms of 
empathy; 
dagger pointed 
at viewer 
increases 
involvement: it 
can be 
interpreted as 
threat, but also 
as political 
strategy to 
attract 
followers. 
Dagger as 
symbol of male 
virility, 
masculinity. 
Executioner’s 
hand on 
prisoner seems 
to suggest that 
the act of 
execution may 
be regarded as a 
reward (prize) 
for joining the 
group. 
Pictur
e 2 
2 C 
 
No vectors; the 
two bodies are 
represented as 
‘timeless’: there is 
a subtle action 
(executioner 
points dagger at 
the viewer, by 
lifting one arm); 
the two bodies are 
distributed 
systematically: 
they are brought 
together by 
imminent 
execution. 
D: medium shot; viewer 
induced to establish a 
social relationship with 
subjects in the picture 
C: direct contact with 
viewer; the executioner 
points dagger towards 
the viewer (viewer is 
addressed directly), 
symbolically demanding 
something out of the 
viewer. 
P: frontal angle; viewer 
experiences increased 
identification/involveme
nt with the scene. 
I: centrality: background 
emphasises the two bodies 
located at the centre of the 
image to increase the 
viewer’s attention. 
F: discontinuity between the 
two actors, achieved via the 
colour contrast of their 
outfits and the gap between 
the bodies.  
S: black outfit of 
executioner. Ninjas, in 
Japanese tradition, signified 
a sense of ‘invisibility. The 
orange attire of prisoner is a 
reference to the orange 
scrubs of Guantanamo 
Bay’s prisoners, but it also 
has a cinematographic 
recognition (the orange 
uniform will be recognised 
as an indication of a 
Identification 
with the 
representation 
and symbols 
projected by the 
image. Power 
dynamics: 
black figure 
holds knife in 
sign of 
demand/threat. 
Knife as sign of 
masculinity/mal
e virility. Black 
outfit evokes 
ninja’s outfit 
and their sense 
of power, 
physical 
strength, 
assassination. 
Static, iconic 
prisoner thanks to TV series 
like Orange is the New 
Black). 
M: sensory modality 
increases the surreal 
symbolism of the action 
(beheading). Victim is on 
his knees while executioner 
is standing. Typical gesture 
of beheadings reminding of 
ancient forms of punishment 
(execution) in history and 
culture. 
image: political 
message- threat 
and attraction to 
this pseudo 
military life.  
Pictur
e 3 
2 C 
 
No vectors; the 
two bodies are 
represented as 
‘timeless’: there 
are no subtle 
actions 
(executioner’s 
arms are 
motionless); the 
two bodies are 
distributed 
systematically: 
they are brought 
together by 
imminent 
execution, despite 
their apparent 
distance. The two 
figures become 
part of an 
‘iconographic’ 
representation of 
an execution. 
D: medium shot; viewer 
induced to establish a 
social relationship with 
subjects in the picture 
C: direct contact with 
viewer: viewer’s 
attention is on the 
prisoner, even though 
executioner looks 
directly at the viewer, 
symbolically demanding 
establishing power 
dynamics. 
P: frontal angle; viewer 
experiences increased 
identification/involveme
nt with the scene. 
I: centrality: background 
emphasises the two bodies 
located at the centre of the 
image to increase the 
viewer’s attention. The line 
of the horizon highlights 
power dynamics: 
executioner /prisoner 
F: discontinuity between the 
two actors, achieved via the 
colour contrast of their 
outfits and the gap between 
the bodies.  
S: black outfit of 
executioner. Ninjas, in 
Japanese tradition, signified 
a sense of ‘invisibility. The 
orange attire of prisoner is a 
reference to the orange 
scrubs of Guantanamo 
Bay’s prisoners, but it also 
has a cinematographic 
recognition (TV series 
Orange is the New Black). 
M: sensory modality 
increases the surreal 
symbolism of the action 
(beheading). Victim is on 
his knees while executioner 
is standing. Typical gesture 
of beheadings reminding of 
ancient forms of punishment 
(execution) in history and 
culture. 
Less 
identification 
with the 
representation 
and symbols in 
the image. 
Power 
dynamics: 
distance 
between two 
bodies signifies 
their different 
roles and 
dynamics of 
subordination. 
black figure 
holds by his 
side: no as 
strong sense of 
demand as in 
previous image. 
Knife as sign of 
masculinity/mal
e virility. Black 
outfit evokes 
ninja’s outfit 
and their sense 
of power, 
physical 
strength, 
assassination. 
Static, iconic 
image: political 
message- threat 
and attraction to 
this pseudo 
military life. 
Pictur
e 4 
5 N 
 
There are vectors 
(the executioners 
are disposed 
around the 
prisoner; their 
bodies point 
towards the 
prisoner); each 
body is presented 
as playing a part in 
the main action 
(beheading). 
D: medium shot; viewer 
induced to establish a 
social relationship with 
subjects in the picture 
C: no much contact with 
the viewer: executioners 
and prisoners look away. 
P: frontal angle; viewer 
experiences increased 
identification/involveme
nt with the scene, 
despite the fact actors 
looking away. 
I: centrality: executioner s 
in the background faction as 
marginal elements; attention 
on the prisoner, located at 
the centre of the image: this 
stresses the position of the 
victim as 
hopeless/vulnerable and the 
strength of the marginal 
elements. 
F: continuity among the 
actors, achieved via the 
colour of their outfits and 
the proximity in which they 
stand.  
S: prisoner’s head looking 
away. 
This image 
seems to 
suggest strong 
differences 
between the 
west (prisoner) 
and east 
(executioners): 
prisoner kneels, 
surrounded by 
executioner s. 
Dynamics of 
subordination: 
east wins over 
west. Image 
suggests threat, 
violence, 
M: naturalistic modality: 
the scene is not as staged as 
the other images and gives 
viewers an idea of what a 
real execution is like (as 
opposed to a more 
surreal/symbolic/iconograph
ic execution). Victim is on 
his knees while executioners 
are standing. Typical 
gesture of beheadings 
reminding of ancient forms 
of punishment (execution) 
in history and culture. 
demand and 
power. Political 
strategic 
message not 
strong: 
perfunctory to 
demand and 
execute. 
Weapons: 
masculinity, 
male virility.  
Pictur
e 5 
2 N 
 
There are vectors 
(the executioner’s 
hand touches the 
prisoner’s 
shoulder/neck; his 
head is slightly 
tilted towards the 
prisoner); the two 
bodies are 
represented as 
anticipating the 
main action 
(beheading): there 
is a subtle action 
(executioner 
points dagger at 
the viewer, by 
lifting one arm and 
leaving his free 
arm on the 
prisoner). 
D: medium shot; viewer 
induced to establish a 
social relationship with 
subjects in the picture 
C: direct contact with 
viewer; the executioner 
points dagger towards 
the viewer (viewer is 
addressed directly), 
symbolically demanding 
something out of the 
viewer. The executioner 
also puts his hand on the 
prisoner, establishing a 
stronger connection 
between the viewer and 
the prisoner. The head of 
the executioner is 
slightly tilted to the side 
of the prisoner. This 
creates stronger empathy 
between viewer and 
prisoner, establishing in 
this way, the power of 
the executioner. 
P: frontal, slightly high 
angle: viewer 
experiences increased 
identification/involveme
nt with the scene, but 
also has power over the 
scene (recruitment 
purpose?) 
I: centrality: background 
emphasises the two bodies 
located at the centre of the 
image to increase the 
viewer’s attention. The line 
of the horizon seems to 
increase attention on the 
executioner’s 
neckline/shoulders/head. 
F: continuity between the 
two actors, achieved via the 
executioner’s arm resting on 
prisoner’s shoulder/neck. 
This continuity is extended 
to the viewer via the 
pointing of the dagger.  
S: black outfit of 
executioner. Ninjas, in 
Japanese tradition, signified 
a sense of ‘invisibility. The 
orange attire of prisoner is a 
reference to the orange 
scrubs of Guantanamo 
Bay’s prisoners, but it also 
has a cinematographic 
recognition (TV series 
Orange is the New Black). 
M: sensory modality 
increases the surreal 
symbolism of the action 
(beheading). Victim is on 
his knees while executioner 
is standing. Typical gesture 
of beheadings reminding of 
ancient forms of punishment 
(execution) in history and 
culture. 
Staged scene 
suggesting 
dynamics 
power, control 
and threat. 
Black attire 
reminding of 
ninjas: strength, 
guerrilla, 
mercenary.  
Strong 
relationship 
between viewer 
and actors in 
image: 
involvement in 
both terms of 
empathy (partly 
achieved via the 
executioner’s 
hand on the 
prisoner’s 
shoulder and 
the 
executioner’s 
head being 
tilted to the 
prisoner’s side); 
dagger pointed 
at viewer 
increases 
involvement: 
demand, threat, 
but also as 
political 
strategy to 
present a 
surreal image of 
IS guerrilla.  
Dagger as 
symbol of male 
virility, 
masculinity. 
Executioner’s 
hand on 
prisoner seems 
to suggest that 
the act of 
execution may 
be a reward 
(prize) for 
joining the 
group 
 Discussion  
Some common elements emerge across the five pictures. The images propose both 
narrative and conceptual structures: these are enriched by strong symbols, which aim to 
construct both stories/actions and surreal representations. Pictures 1, 4, 5 construct narrative 
representations, where the actors in the image impart to viewers the idea that an action is 
unfolding: in these pictures vectors connect executioners to the prisoner and to the viewers 
(the militant’s arms are stretched towards the prisoner and the viewer). Pictures 2 and 3 
portray more conceptual patterns, with the actors in the image not doing anything, but rather 
as being the ‘representation of punishment’. Despite these being screenshots from videos, the 
images project a sense of ‘doing’ and movement. Furthermore, three lines of discussion 
emerge from the visual analysis: 1) the construction of power and masculinity these images 
attempt to disseminate; 2) the staging of an almost surreal scene of beheading; 3) the use of 
these theatrics as a political message.  To demonstrate the visual power of terrorist theatrics, I 
have associated the screenshots to a wide range of images, coming from visual arts. These 
images come from popular culture, paintings, medieval marginalia and propaganda posters. 
They also come from different historical periods and geographical locations. The point I 
intend to raise with this association is that the Islamic State (unintentionally or intentionally) 
choreographs its executions in a manner that is recognisable and in line with what has been 
historically and transnationally associated to the idea of executions and recruitment.  
 
1. Beheadings, power and masculinity. 
Common traits that accumulate across the five pictures are the dynamics between 
executioners and prisoners, with the former standing next to or behind the latter, and the use 
of weapons. Salience in composition meaning in pictures 1,2,3,5 demonstrates the contrast 
between the black outfit of the executioner and the orange uniform of the prisoner: the focus 
is on the executioner. Other than their connection to the organisation’s flag, the black attire 
worn by Islamic State militants may (unintendedly) remind young Western audiences of 
shinobi (ninja) culture from medieval Japan (Pictures B, C, Appendix 2). Ninjas appear 
frequently in popular culture: films, video games, TV-shows and animation can feature a 
fantasised depiction of ninjas warriors. The image of the ninja may be decoded in different 
ways, depending on cultural variables, but it is potentially recognisable at a global level. 
Furthermore, Ninjas have always been associated with assassination, mercenary and 
clandestine warfare, along with espionage: Japanese medieval chronicles described shinobi as 
kancho (spies), teisatsu (scouts), kisho (surprise attackers), and koran (agitators) (Turnbull, 
2003: 9), attributes that can also be used to describe Islamic State militants. According to 
Turnbull (2003), the earliest visual reference to a ninja dressed in black goes back to 1801: 
the choice of black clothing refers to the sense of being invisible and, in this way, effective in 
clandestine combat. For Islamic State militants, the black outfit also echoes the black 
standard, traditionally associated to one of the flags flown by Muhammad. Black carries the 
sense of tradition, along with warfare. 
The popularisation and myths of ninjas mean that the semiotics of their attires are 
cross-border and transnational, being recognisable to both eastern and western audiences. The 
body of the (unintended) ninja/Islamic soldier becomes a vehicle of meanings. It carries the 
sense of hegemonic masculinity, power and subversion. The static, iconic images of 
executions (Pictures 1,2,3,5) convey the message that the Islamic State ‘solider’ is an 
invincible power that can attack any time. Masculinity and power are reinforced by the 
staging of the execution and the images’ conceptual patterns: pictures 2 and 3 show 
discontinuity between the two actors, allowing viewers to focus their attention on the black-
clad figure and the symbolic message he attempts to divulge. 
The framing in the compositional meaning of pictures 1 and 5 displays continuity 
between the two participants in the image: this is achieved via the executioner’s arm resting 
on the prisoner’s back/shoulder. Continuity is also extended to viewers via the pointing of the 
dagger towards the camera. The composition hints that the entities inside the picture 
(executioner and prisoner) and outside the picture (viewers) belong together. This creates 
power dynamics among all entities involved: the executioner keeps the image together, 
establishing, in this way, his dominance over victim and viewer. Traditionally, the figure of 
executioner has been conceived as playing a role in divine justice (De Maistre, 1821; Potter, 
1993). The iconography of Islamic State executions seems to emphasise dynamics of 
subordination between victim and perpetrators (the west kneeling down to the east): picture 4 
is particularly effective at demonstrating this. The victim is powerless in a scene that is rough 
and graphic (naturalistic modality). Furthermore, in pictures 1,2,3,5 victims do not show 
emotions: this makes viewers less likely to identify themselves with the victim, leading to a 
stronger focus on the symbolic act of beheading and its perpetrator. Viewers are encouraged 
to connect with the militant and the image of power and masculinity he intends to set out. It 
could be argued that the message that comes from this is an abstract political concept rather 
than a personal story between two actors. Picture 4 differs from this: emotions on the victim’s 
face are more perceivable, allowing viewers to connect with him.  
Power and subordination dynamics are also reinforced by the fact that executioners 
carry weapons. A dagger is visible in pictures 1,2,3,5, whereas a Kalashnikov stands out in 
picture 4. Weapons are symbolic of masculinity and male virility. The use of daggers and 
other weapons are not just a way to assert power or purposive for the aims of the beheading, 
but they are also an enactment of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005). Propaganda 
posters from World War I and World War II (Pictures D, E, G) played of this sense of 
masculine power, showing images of soldiers carrying weapons. Drawing on a wide range of 
studies, Page (2009) suggests a strong relationship between weapons, power and masculinity, 
emphasising how this link emerges from a complex knit of multiple social factors, along with 
perception and glamorisation of weapons. Visual analysis of beheadings seems to confirm 
this symbolic use to assert a normative ideal of power.  
 
2. Theatrics in terrorist executions. 
A salient aspect that emerges from semiotic analysis of the pictures is that sense of 
staged, crafted spectacle. Specifically, analysis attached to the composition meaning brings to 
the surface a narrative that shifts to a surreal, conceptual symbolism.  
Kepel (2004) suggests that, from an Islamic perspective, beheadings represent the 
most traditional capital execution: religious texts describe stories of Muslims cutting the 
heads of their enemies. In this respect, the decapitation staged in pictures 1,2,3,5 aims to 
visually affirm this tradition. When confronted with images of executions, the skills involved 
with beheading should be also considered: cutting through tissues and bones is not an easy 
exercise. Larson (2014: 89) highlights the unpredictability of beheading, emphasising how 
removing somebody’s head with a knife or an axe in a single clean motion (while the person 
is still alive) requires a lot of strength, skill and luck.  In this respect, beheading as a terrorist 
strategy is effective only in terms of theatricality, rather than an effective way of killing the 
enemy. 
The power of image is an important aspect when attempting to understand the use of 
beheadings by the Islamic State. The visual impact of the imminent executions in pictures 1 
and 5 is very strong mainly because of the vectors that link executioner, prisoner and viewers. 
This creates a bond, a relationship between actors in the pictures and viewers.  The viewer is 
struck by the composure and solemnity of the act: Islamic State militants attempt to project a 
pseudo rituality to legitimize their action. Executions follow the same visual procedure: the 
Islamic State militant, dressed in black, is behind the victim, dressed in orange scrubs 
(pictures 1,2,35). The militant’s body emanates a sense of threat towards the perceived 
enemy (the West, the infidels), holding a knife. The victim is subdued (however, composed) 
and involuntarily plays a part in this spectacle. This is visible in the surreality of pictures 
1,2,3,5 (carefully composed, designed to be spectacular and impress) and in the 
perfunctoriness of picture 4. This may reinforce the fact that the Islamic State (as a political 
project) is more based on the power of visuals and the staging of attacks, rather than relying 
on more established military or political routes. 
Drawing on Austin and Butlers’ concept of performativity and Goffman’s 
dramaturgical model, I suggest beheadings represent the enactment of performativity of 
spectacular violence. I should clarify how I use the idea of performativity outside its 
linguistics and philosophical location. The concept of ‘performative’ permits to move beyond 
the description of an experience, but rather engagement with it. Butler (1997) suggests that 
performances reinforce and divulge people’s identity in society. Austin (1962) describes how 
words allow the construction of events and actively shape people’s performances. The 
dramaturgical perspective (Goffman, 1990) encourages us to look at people’s identity and 
social interactions as roles performed on stage. Therefore, human social behaviour is scripted 
according to the roles taken on by actors. Each performance is an attempt to construct 
specific impressions and present idealised views of a situation.  
With this theoretical framework, I propose to look at beheadings as a performance, 
that becomes legitimised (in the eyes of the organization) via repetition and self-citation: the 
scenes portrayed in pictures 1,2,3,5 have become an iconography of terrorist subculture and, 
to a certain extent, they are divulged and reproduced in popular culture and satire (see Picture 
A in Appendix 2). Islamic State’s use of orange uniforms for its prisoners is a symbolic 
representation of the essence of a prisoner, with the orange scrubs reminding viewers of both 
Guantanamo Bay’s inmates and popular TV shows like Orange is the New Black. Like for 
the black attire, the globalisation of popular culture allows people from different cultural 
backgrounds to identify what the orange uniform stands for. Picture 4 differs from this 
pattern: the image is presented in naturalistic modality (as opposed to the sensory modality of 
pictures 1,2,3,5), giving viewers a more robust taste of what an execution entails. Pictures of 
beheadings like pictures 4 do not seem to have captured people’s imaginary as much as 
images of the orange-clad prisoner. In fact, when performing an image search of executions 
via engines like Google, the performative of executions featuring black and orange figures is 
the most predominant.  
Performance theory draws attention to the performative nature of societies and how 
rituals and daily behaviours are governed by an implicit code of performance. The difference 
in modality of the five pictures emphasises just that. From a performance theory perspective, 
individuals elaborate their own performative trajectory in life, making society a product of 
performance. Goffman suggests:  
 
When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take 
seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe 
that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, 
that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed 
for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be (Goffman, 1969:17) 
 
Islamic State militants employ performative violence to reinforce both their individual 
and collective identities. The role of ritualistic violence performed by the Islamic State is, 
consequently, to shape its community from the inside and in the eyes of the world. 
Executions aim to make the Islamic State more robust than a virtual state via the use of 
performative punishment.  
The use of spectacular punishments and violence to establish and legitimise power is 
not a new experience. Uses of terror and corporal punishment for the means of social control 
have been a feature in humankind’s history. Cavarero (2011: 2) suggests that “the words 
terrorism and war evoke concepts from the past and muddle them rather than give them fresh 
relevance”. In medieval times, executions were carried in front of a half alarmed, half excited 
crowd. The slaying of criminals went beyond its punitive aim, but had the dual function of 
entertaining and deterring people from disobeying. Nowadays the stage of spectacular 
punishments has moved from a physical arena to a virtual space (eg. youtube): due to its 
ancient origin, the Islamic State has revived this ‘out-dated’3 form of punishment, relying, as 
I mentioned, on its visual effectiveness.  
As anticipated at the beginning of this work, we are witnessing a revival of medieval 
attitudes in our society: on 22nd July 2011, Norwegian citizen Anders Breivik set off a car 
bomb in front of the office of the Prime Minister and other government buildings in Oslo. 
The causalities amounted to 8 deaths and over 200 wounded. Later Breivik attacked a 
summer camp on the island of Utøya, killing 69 people and wounding 110. This was the 
deadliest attack in Norway since the Second World War. Breivik described himself as a 
member of a neo-medieval, underground paramilitary group known as the Knights Templar. 
In this respect, I suggest that the Islamic State may rely on the power and familiarity that 
                                                
3 Deliberately outdated as the Islamic State rejects modernity and intends to recreate golden age of Islam. 
‘fictional medieval narratives’ exercise on young people (which I refer to as ‘the Game of 
Thrones generation”) thanks to fantasy TV shows, films and video games.  
There are many examples all throughout history that display the seduction violence 
exercises on people, particularly the seduction that executions instigate. As mentioned earlier, 
cutting off somebody’s head delivers a strong message of power because heads are the centre 
of people’s senses. Furthermore, the semiotics of beheadings encourage a wider reflection: in 
all pictures victims are on their knees (traditionally, kneeling and bowing have been regarded 
as a gesture of surrender or of humiliation), executioners stand tall (symbol of power), 
executions receive centre stage and prisoners do not seem to display fear (perhaps, the 
function of an unperturbed victim is to legitimise the power of the executioner). Yet, victims 
are submissive/passive, emphasising the power of the executioner. Larson (2014) points out 
that in medieval and modern Europe, decapitation was an honourable way to die. In relation 
to the Islamic State, I suggest that this act may be carried because, in the eyes of militants, it 
also dignifies executioners, legitimising the strength of their organisation. It delivers the 
message of surrender and power (eg. the Islamic State) at the centre of the virtual square (i.e. 
global landscape).   
In this work, I have connected beheadings to images that are similar to the ones 
medieval people would have recognised. The connection between beheadings and middle 
ages helps create assumptions regarding the more mundane sentiments (e.g. thrill, 
entertainment, excitement) that executions may trigger in some individuals. Bakhtin (1984) 
theorises people’s fascination with spectacular punishment by suggesting that medieval 
people lived two lives: an official one that was subjugated to strict orders and behavioural 
codes; and a second life that occurred in the carnival square (during the period of the 
carnival). This was a grotesque experience, characterised by satire, collective ridicule, 
laughter, violations of decorum and subversion of values. The sense of mockery and 
amusement that accompanied beheadings was also concretised in visual representations: 
picture F shows a marginalis that adorned medieval manuscripts. It represents beheadings by 
sword, where the executioner is a rabbit, symbol of fertility/prosperity that is turned upside-
down and becomes ‘dangerous’, evil. Other marginalia featured fantastic creatures and/or 
apes beheading people: medieval audiences would have recognised these images as symbols 
of demons, but would have also found them exciting and entertaining.  
These same dynamics are visible in the executions of the Islamic State, where the 
terrorist narrative is embroidered by performance, glamorisation of the guerrilla and threat. 
Pictures 1,2,3,5 show an attempt to divulge strict pseudo religious dogmas: sensorial 
modality and salience create an iconography of execution, that is theatrical and involves 
viewers in the scene. The images are not repellent, but almost polished (therefore more 
suitable for mass dissemination). Picture 4, through its naturalistic modality, gives viewers a 
sense of the grotesque: the prisoner looks away, the image is not polished, but viewers are 
drawn to it. Therefore, it is possible to establish some connections between the images of 
beheadings disseminated by the Islamic State and the functions that executions had in the 
past. However, a main difference is visible: the grotesque elements that are identified with 
the carnival period are not, in the case of Islamic State executions, restricted to a specific 
moment. On the contrary, they are ongoing, continuous and can occur at any time. Yet, the 
analogy between Islamic State executions and the carnival is justified in the sense that the 
component of entertainment visible in the carnival is also present in today’s executions. 
Beheadings are televised, divulged and glamorised, partly, as I will argue in the following 
section, for political propaganda, partly for recruitment purposes.  
 
3. Beheadings as Political performance  
 
Emerging from the analysis is this idea of theatrics and spectacle that have a 
multifunctional aim: displaying dynamics of power and masculinity and 
entertainment/attraction like in medieval times. However, analysis of the interactive meaning 
brings to the surface an extra layer. The social nearness (distance between viewers and what 
is represented in the images) in all pictures is medium shot. This induces viewers to establish 
a relationship with the subjects in the image (Jewitt and Oyama, 2001).  There is direct 
contact with the viewer and the point of view of the image consists of a frontal angle, which 
also encourages viewers to be involved with the scene. Pictures 1,2,3,5 (to a lesser extent, 
picture 4) support an increased identification between viewer and action. The combination of 
viewers’ involvement and a staged composition of the execution raise questions regarding the 
further motivations for such a theatrical beheading. It could be argued that specular 
executions have the goal to legitimise the terrorist cause, but they also glamorise war for 
recruitment. The audience targeted by the Islamic State is particularly receptive to the 
glamorisation of executions: on one hand, executions are choreographed to appeal to the 
‘Games of Thrones generation where fantasy reconstructs surreal, polished executions. On 
the other hand, the theatrics of beheadings ensure that enemies are terrorised and repelled.  
Throughout history, young people have been fascinated by the idea of making war 
and fighting for a cause, like in the case of World War I, when joining the front represented 
for many an opportunity to leave home, go abroad and reach manhood. Agamben (2008) 
suggested that through rituals, a society (e.g. Islamic State) decides who is sacred and who is 
not. With the ritualistic, spectacular violence of beheadings (and their ritualised repetitions), 
the Islamic State attempts to legitimise its role as a State: the organisation has created a visual 
format that is iconographic and purposive. Agamben defines as homo sacer a life that can be 
killed, but not sacrificed. Victims of decapitations are a specific type of homo sacer: 
Agamben (2008) argues that homo sacer are politically irrelevant, but in the case of Islamic 
State, they are relevant because they reaffirm their militancy.  
Nick Berg was executed in Iraq in May 2004. Reuters released an unedited video of 
his execution, whose shorter clips were later reposted by major news channels across the 
world. Newspapers reported opinions of medical experts who saw the video: these reports 
were extremely meticulous in their description of the scene, raising the question of whether 
such a high level of details was indeed necessary. The shift from broadcast to social media 
means that images are shared much faster than they used to be, increasing people’s terrorist 
voyeurism and making terrorism almost instantaneous. Bakhtin’s carnival square has become 
virtual and spatial, enacting an ongoing satire: this virtual carnival allows the consumption of 
beheadings from the safe space of our homes, turning beheadings into a virtual political 
performance. For Kepel, beheadings are powerful in the sense that they create a morbid 
fascination, especially among young people, for whom the lines between cinematographic 
violence and reality are blurred (Kepel, 2004). Picart (2007) discusses the emergence of a 
gothic criminology to discuss people’s infatuation with what is gruesome, evil and bloody. In 
this respect, the performance of beheading has much more effect than other terrorist 
performances (eg. suicide bombings), not only for its low costs, but also because people 
consuming the scene from home can identify themselves with either the body whose head has 
been cut off (Kepel, 2004) or, I suggest, with the executioner. Harrow (2011) suggests 
decapitation is a strategy that has maximum visibility, resonance and implants maximum 
fear. The victim becomes an instrument in the staging of a terrorist carnival and in the 
implementation of theatrical pseudo-military tactics. Analysis of the interactive meanings in 
the semiotics of beheading seems to support this: particularly, pictures 1 and 5 achieve that 
thanks to the continuity among viewer, executioner and victim. These two pictures seem to 
echo propaganda posters like those in pictures D, E, H and G (appendix 2). The dagger is 
pointed at the viewer in the gesture of symbolically demanding something and threatening (‘it 
could be you here!’), but also attracting the viewer from outside the image to the inside: 
‘have you volunteered yet?’ (picture E); ‘what are you waiting for?’ (picture D).  
The high rate of young people born in the West joining the cause of Islamic State 
raises the question on how this ‘violent performative’ impacts on recruitment. Based on 
visual analysis, I believe two perspectives should be considered: violence as theatrical 
‘pseudo’ military tactics and the importance of visual/social media in contemporary warfare 
and its legitimisation. 
The 9/11 attacks marked a new era for terrorism as images of the attack were divulged 
almost in real time across the globe. The images of planes hitting the Twin Towers and the 
bodies falling from the windows were similar to the images we saw in apocalyptic films. The 
attacks were not simply political statements, but seemed to be carefully crafted for mass 
consumption. Cowen (2006) regards terrorism as a spectacle produced for viewers: drawing 
on Sorel’s work on violence, where it is argued that dictatorships stage public executions so 
that citizens have a memorable visual story (Sorel, 1999), Cowen (2006) suggests terrorist 
organisations reproduce a similar narrative: staging of spectacular terrorist behaviours can 
motivate and aid fundraising for subsequent terrorists. In this respect, I refer to beheadings as 
theatrical tactics, because their goal is not just the alienation of the enemy, but also the 
projection of a narrative that attracts new recruits. The fascination and, in a way, the 
glamorisation that executions trigger in individuals constitute the most dangerous aspect of 
the Islamic State. Finding a way to engage with that may impact on future policies and law-
enforcement strategies. 
The theatrical tactics employed by the Islamic State to legitimise and publicise their 
cause are also part of a broader discussion on the importance of visual media in contemporary 
warfare. Most scholarship on the use of video by terrorist organisations has focused on its 
power of divulging fear or as means of propaganda (Friis, 2015). In line with that, I suggest 
that the propagandistic side should be explored more thoroughly. Islamic State’s warfare is 
peculiar because it relies on the pictures of attacks and executions. Without the resonance 
these images receive, via platforms like YouTube and/or other social media, recruitment and 
the survival of the organisation would be effected. Images are the main ammunitions used in 
this pseudo warfare.   
 
Limitations of the social semiotic approach 
 Social semiotics and the techniques involved with multimodal analysis have been 
selected and adapted as the most appropriate methods of investigation because they are based 
on the idea of layered meaning and layered interpretation of images. They emphasise a 
relationship among signs, signifiers, objects and those who interpret them (Eco, 1975). This 
provides researchers with a structure in which to locate their analysis. However, this form of 
analysis is subject to limitations and drawbacks.  
 While the analysis performed in this work follows structured parameters, it is 
nonetheless subject to a strong interpretative component.  Rastier (1998: 222) suggests that 
even when attempting to create a general category of interpretation, we still employ our own 
typology of standards, modes and interpretative regimes. In other words, we, as researchers, 
apply an interpretative principle to the parameters we aim to assess. Similar to other 
qualitative approaches, a pure, scientific neutrality is beyond the reach of the semiotics 
method. In the analysis presented here, I attempted to suggest patterns and signs that could be 
considered transnational and cross-cultural. Different audiences would have a different 
positionality: images may be recognisable, but not decoded in the same way. Furthermore, 
my selection was informed by my cultural identity and my research expertise. Another 
limitation of this approach is that social semiotics and multimodal analysis may be time 
consuming, too technical and laborious: the same image or video should be assessed several 
times and from different interpretative perspectives and meta-functions. When the sample is 
large, this may cause errors and inaccuracies.  
 Social semiotics is not, therefore, infallible. However, its contribution is that it 
presents an analytical framework that allows us to make sense of experiences and populations 
that are beyond our reach with other methods. This type of investigative approach offers us a 
way to explore what we may somehow understand at an intuitive level, but have no other 
systematic manner to test.  
 
Concluding thoughts: implications for addressing the iconography of terrorist 
subculture. 
Images of Islamic State militants arranging heads of their decapitated victims have 
also been divulged via media: again, an analogy with medieval times can be found. In fact, 
the arranging of severed heads evokes the way medieval people used to dig out corpses and 
remove their heads, so that they were sure bodies were dead. It was an ultimate reassurance 
that no resurrection would occur. In the beheadings by the Islamic State the same symbolism 
can be perceived: images spread the message that the infidel will not resurrect. Terrorist 
executions revive old images which are nonetheless cross-border and transnational.  The 
deeds committed by Islamic State militants bring to surface two main implications for the 
way ‘their’ violence is articulated: violence as a strategic, spectacular consumption and the 
use of violence as a means to instigate what I call terrorist voyeurism (the compulsive 
fascination with seeing images of executions). Žižek (2009) discusses people’s reaction to 
terrorism in terms of subjective violence. This violence is conducted by a clearly identifiable 
agent and creates an immediate physical, physiological reaction. Beheadings are also a 
subjective type of violence: they trigger penal voyeurism, they instigate a reaction and create 
a theatre that both legitimise the Islamic State as a political project and attract young people 
who are used to cinematographic executions. Viewers are pulled into the image and are more 
receptive to the message. A sense of complicity is established between militant and viewer. 
Drawing on Žižek’s work I suggest that the subjectivity of beheadings is visually 
crafted in such a way that people expect a quick counter-response: a military mobilisation, 
social division, but, for some individuals, involvement. In the aftermath of terrorist 
executions, the theatrics of beheadings call for a collective response: civil society wishes to 
see a counter-attack, whereas terrorist sympathisers would wish to partake in the images of 
victory (eg. beheadings). These actions/reactions, infused with morbid fascination, spectacle 
and solemnity, can play a part in recruitment. The use of televised executions is this: the 
sensory modality of beheadings creates a ‘romanticised’ vision of terrorist warfare. In people 
who are more prone to succumb to extremist discourses, this may trigger enthusiasm for 
doing violence and may constitute one of the motivations for young westerners to join 
Islamic State militancy. Today like in the past, rituals and images enhance and legitimise 
dogmas and beliefs. Nowadays, however, engagement with rituals and images has changed in 
terms of global mobility and intersection of various occurrences (e.g. religion, films, video 
games, social media, politics).   
From visual analysis, it seems apparent that images of beheadings aim to create a 
close social nearness/distance between viewers and actors in the image. This may impact 
upon recruitment due to the staging of a fantasy warfare and a glamorised morbid narrative 
that the terrorist organisation attempts to tell. The true brutality of guerrilla is not ‘publicised’ 
to the same extent of these surreal images because, strategically, it does not serve the purpose 
of mobilisation as well as crafted images.  
Deglamourizing something that has been put together with the goal to create an 
iconographic narrative is perhaps the challenge of policy-makers and counter-terrorism 
strategies.  In this respect, France may be a step closer to achieve that: in an editorial in 
French newspaper Le Monde, Fenoglio (2016) called for French media to stop publishing 
photos and names of Jihadists to avoid posthumous glorification. If this approach had to be 
adopted by all mass and social media across the globe, terrorist spectacular strategies would 
lose part of their strength.  
Finally, taking the study of terrorist organisations and subcultures forward, a more 
‘mundane’ discussion should walk side to side with traditional, orthodox approaches to 
terrorism and radicalization. In a world of professional insecurity, political instability and 
social isolation, the power of images and constructed representation via social media cannot 
be omitted by criminological discourses on extreme, pseudo political/religious practices.  
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Appendix 1: Pictures of Execution. 
 
These come from screenshots of videos. The main website that divulged them is SITE, a 
terrorism monitoring group.  
 
Picture 1: James Foley, 19th August 2014 
 
 
Picture 2: Steven Sotloff, 2nd September 
2014 
 
 
Picture 3: David Haines, 13th September 
2014 
 
Picture 4: Hervé Gourdel, 24th September 
2014 
 
 
Picture 5: Alan Henning, 3rd October 
2014 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 2:  
	
Picture A: 
Jenus di Nazareth, 2nd March 2015. Pillole di Jenus. ©Magicpress Edizioni srl.	
	
	
	
Picture B: 
Utagawa Toyonobu, 1883. A ninja attacking Hydeyoshi’s retainers. ©Honolulu Museum of 
Art. Object number: 23992	
	
	
	
	 	
Picture C: 
Utagawa Kunisada, 1852. Ninja about to attack Prince Genji. ©PICTURES FROM 
HISTORY	
	
	
	
Picture D: 
Giulio Bertoletti, 1943-1944. E tu… cosa fai? [and you… what are you doing?]. ©The 
Wolfsonian-Florida International University, The Mitchell Wolfson, Jr. Collection. 
Accession: XX1990.2248	
	
	
	
	 	
Picture E:  
Dimitrii Moor, 1920. Did you volunteer? ©British Library Board, Shelf-mark: 
HS.74/2009(10) 
	
	
	
Picture F: 
Decretals of Gregory IX with gloss of Bernard of Parma, c1300-c1340. Detail of a bas-de-
page. ©British Library Board, Royal MS 10 E IV, f61v. 
	
	
	
	 	
Picture G: 
James Flagg, c1917. I want you for the U.S Army. © Library of Congress prints and 
photographs. Number: 96507165 
	
	
	
Picture H: 
Who’s absent? 1915. © Imperial War Museums. Art. IWM PTS 0314	
	
	
	
